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Banks must help solve the lurking crisis 
in mortgage defaults 
An estimated 200,000 home loans are now 'under water' 
By Professor Sandeep Gopalan  
Thursday March 04 2010  
A mortgage default crisis lurks underneath the surface. Yet all we hear is talk. Cheap 
talk about a government bailout, without concrete action, only creates incentives for 
borrowers to defer payments in the hope of a better deal, hastening a crisis.  
Half measures like the mortgage relief plan and suspension of repossessions won't 
work. President Obama's $75bn (€55bn) rescue plan did not stop 2.8 million 
foreclosure filings in the US in 2009. Band-Aid cannot stop arterial bleeding. 
Emergency procedures are needed.  
Here's why. An estimated 200,000 Irish mortgages are under water.  
Monthly payments are significantly in excess of prevailing market rents for similar 
properties, meaning that the payments are good money thrown after bad. It makes 
little economic sense to continue to make these high payments when many borrowers 
can ill afford them.  
Given the psychological aversion to losing one's home, mortgage payments are 
prioritised over other expenditure. Homeowners are deferring other spending in order 
to keep up with their mortgages, continuing the spiral of money away from 
economically productive uses to prop up still unsustainably high property prices.  
Mortgage tax relief contributes to this waste. We need to strip away antiquated value 
judgments about debt and approach mortgages from a purely economic perspective. 
When a similar house can be rented for several hundred euro less (in the same or a 
comparable neighbourhood) why stay and pay more? Why should the State subsidise 
an unaffordable lifestyle via mortgage relief?  
No one ever complains about mortgage relief, even though this socialist-sounding, 
help-the-average-Joe plan is actually a wealth transfer to banks.  
Would it not be preferable to allow underwater homebuyers to walk away? The 
answer is a qualified yes, but significant reform would be needed. First, the state must 
use its financial hold over the banks and change troubled mortgages to make them 
"non-recourse". Banks can then access only the house, in case of default, not other 
assets.  
 
Prudent  
This would help ensure that banks only take prudent risks. If the house is not worth 
the amount of the loan, they bear the risk with no ability to access the borrower's other 
assets.  
Critics complain that allowing underwater borrowers to walk away gives an incentive 
not to repay -- "moral hazard". It could also trigger a crescendo of defaults. They will 
argue that borrowers acted recklessly and should be punished.  
They are right. But we have already thrown moral hazard to the winds by bailing out 
the banks.  
Virtually every decision taken to rescue the economy from collapse entails moral 
hazard. How is this one any worse than those created by the many pro-lender policies 
of recent vintage?  
Objections might be met by restricting the scheme to first-time homebuyers. But even 
admitting the pitfalls, such a policy has several positive results.  
These include property price correction and channelling savings to more efficient uses.  
Mollycoddling banks by allowing them recourse to other borrower assets only 
insulates them from facing reality. Just as borrowers were not forced to buy 
extravagant houses, banks were not coerced to lend. What is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander.  
If the nuclear option of walking away becomes a real possibility, banks face the 
prospect of recovering a fraction of the outstanding loan in an auction.  
Painful as this is, bankers will take a hard look at alternatives. It might well persuade 
them to adjust monthly payments to reflect market rents for borrowers with the ability 
to pay similar amounts. This might still be profitable if the rental market is strong.  
Desperate times call for desperate remedies and bankers might also learn to get 
creative in ways other than cooking the books. They could enter into equity-debt swap 
deals with borrowers to take advantage of an eventual turnaround in property prices in 
exchange for stable but affordable rent payments.  
This would be a win-win for both parties. It might also signal a return to old-school 
customer-engaged banking. One option for government policy would be to set up a 
professionally managed venture capital (VC) fund to buy suitable properties at 
auction. Such decisive intervention will prevent protracted vacancies and minimise 
blight.  
These properties could be leased out and sold when the market recovers. Taxpayers 
would derive the benefits from property prices going up under this model, in contrast 
to the mortgage assistance plan which is merely robbery by another name from 
prudent people who chose to live within their means.  
Advantages  
The problems caused by having to hold property for long periods could be mitigated 
by opening up the fund to private investors.  
This also has collateral advantages: offering taxpayers the ability to participate in 
profits from the VC fund reduces the deeply divisive political cost of rescue and sets 
off secondary economic activity. It is certainly superior to the alternative of higher 
taxes.  
To be sure, borrowers need to pay a price consistent with our notions of civilised 
justice for their reckless decisions.  
Our legal system fails here too: debt and bankruptcy laws are crude, inefficient, over-
punish, and create bad incentives.  
Reform is essential. Wilful default must be decriminalised.  
Why should taxpayers subsidise the lender's cost of enforcement by allowing him to 
use state police power?  
Even if many defaulting debtors are not being sent to jail, the threat of jail-time casts 
a serious shadow.  
The civil justice system is perfectly adequate to resolve these disputes.  
All debts are not moral debts. Borrowers and lenders must be free to approach paying 
versus defaulting as rational economic options without the threat of the law on one 
side of the deal.  
Finally, the stigma associated with bankruptcy must be buried.  
Irish law's approach to bankruptcy is reminiscent of Nathaniel Hawthorne's 'The 
Scarlet Letter': "It is too deeply branded; Ye cannot take it off."  
Twelve years is too long for exit from bankruptcy, and even then it is not clear that 
reintegration is possible without continuing impediments.  
The system must be based on giving a fresh start rather than on stigmatising and 
hanging an albatross around the debtor's neck.  
The Government's policy of robbing Peter to keep Paul in an expensive house will not 
stop the mortgage default crisis.  
Hard choices are imperative in order to stop a descent into a society of debt slaves.  
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